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This paper concerns the concept of background-structure in a classical field theory. I propose and 
evaluate three ways of fixing the extension of the concept, giving particular attention to the 
bearing of the Anderson-Friedman definition of an absolute object on that task. I attempt to show 
that, though that task cannot end with the Anderson-Friedman definition, that definition 
sharpens––and does not blur––the particular feature of general relativity that is the basis of nearly 
all attempts to fix the extension of the concept. 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper concerns the origin and extension of the concept of background-structure. The 
extension of the concept, before more recent work, was easily circumscribed. The concept 
denoted precisely what is characteristic of the absolute space and time of Newtonian theory and 
of the absolute space-time of special relativity, the alleged conceptual monsters that were slain in 
the transition to the dynamical space-time of general relativity. 
 
Newton thought of absolute space as implicit in his account of causal influence, an 
account in which absolute time is implicitly presupposed. The physical quantity force is not only 
caused but measured by the acceleration of mass, and Newton’s laws define all three quantities 
simultaneously.1 The Newtonian dynamics expressed in the laws and in the corollaries to the 
laws implicitly defines the structure of classical space-time. 
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errors are mine. This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 
1It is significant, however, that absolute space represents a superfluous level of structure––the assumption of a 
privileged rest frame––that is not required for Newton’s account of causal influence. 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The structure of the space-time of Newtonian dynamics may be equally well discussed in 
terms of the theory’s class of inertial systems. The laws of any theory formulated in the 
Newtonian framework or in the extension of that framework by the special theory determine an 
equivalence class of inertial reference frames. In Newtonian physics, those frames presuppose a 
global affine structure and separate metrical structures for space and time; in the special theory, 
they presuppose global affine and conformal structures and also the metrical structure of space-
time. In both theories, those mathematical structures are fixed independently of dynamics, as part 
of the backdrop presupposed by dynamics, and thus, do not evolve along with the classical fields. 
 
Einstein’s general theory of relativity comprises affine, conformal, and metrical 
structures. But, in contradistinction to Newtonian theory and special relativity where those 
structures are necessary presuppositions of the classes of inertial frames, they are determined by 
the distribution of mass-energy in the universe. In this way and others general relativity revises 
what is characteristic about the absolute space and time of Newtonian theory and the absolute 
space-time of special relativity. 
 
Some physicists and philosophers of physics, notably Rovelli (2001, 2004) and Smolin 
(2006), have elevated the dynamical character of general-relativistic geometry to the status of a 
general principle that they call ‘background-independence.’ Moreover, they take general 
relativity to contain a methodological lesson for those pursuing a quantum theory of gravity; 
namely, the particular kind and degree of background-independence exemplified in general 
relativity is an insight about nature that ought to be preserved in a future theory. Smolin (2006, 
10), in particular, takes that lesson to suggest a research strategy that he summarises in the 
following maxim: ‘Seek to make progress by identifying the background structure in our theories 
and removing it, replacing it with relations which evolve subject to dynamical law.’ My larger 
project is to evaluate the methodological status of this maxim, and, in that larger project, I make 
the case against background-independence. 
 
In this short paper, however, I take up the prerequisite task of identifying and 
taxonomising the kinds of mathematical structures that might constitute background. I have two 
goals. (i) I begin by clarifying the sense in which general relativity can be said to be background-
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independent. I review the relativity of motion characteristic of the general theory that commits us 
to the requirement of general covariance––diffeomorphism invariance, on a more modern 
presentation––, and I show that that concept is a much narrower one than background-
independence. (ii) I consider the Anderson-Friedman definition of an absolute object that gives 
rise to another important conception of background-independence. This is the focal point of the 
paper, and I make both the positive and the negative cases for taking that definition as a means of 
identifying and taxonomising background-structure. And, though I set aside my case against 
background-independence for another paper, there are a number of points in this project of 
identification and taxonomy at which the concept of background-independence appears 
altogether chimaerical, and so I do not withhold from making some sceptical remarks that 
nonetheless strengthen that case. 
 
2. Background-independence and general covariance 
There is a sense in which the earliest discussion of background-structure in a classical 
field theory is found in Newton’s criticism of Cartesian physics in De grav. However, let us 
begin by getting clear on the kind and degree of background-independence exemplified in general 
relativity. 
 
Einstein took the first steps towards the relativity of motion characteristic of the general 
theory in the 1905 paper. In that paper, he presented a new relativity principle in order to address 
the incompatibility of electromagnetism with the Galilei-Newton relativity principle. This 
achievement became one of the two basic postulates of the special theory. Yet no sooner was the 
special theory formulated than he began his search for a new theory of gravitation. 
 
In 1907, he realised that inertial mass and gravitational mass are not merely proportional 
or indistinguishable but identical. That identity is established by the so-called equivalence 
principle, according to which it is impossible to distinguish locally between a uniform 
gravitational field and a uniformly accelerated frame; and that identity formed the basis for 
Einstein’s insight that the laws governing non-gravitational interactions take the same form in a 
freely falling frame in a gravitational field that they would take in an inertial frame. In this way 
was the unique status of the classical inertial frame fatally compromised, and the fundamental 
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distinction between inertial and non-inertial frames collapsed. The relevant distinction became 
one between systems in free-fall and non-free-fall motion, and the Lorentz-invariance of the 
equations of motion had to be understood as only a subset of some larger invariance group. 
Einstein sought therefore to generalise the equivalence of inertial frames in special relativity to 
include frames in arbitrary states of motion.2 He referred to that generalisation as the principle of 
general relativity, and he realised that, if that principle is satisfied, there is no way of smoothly 
laying down a global coordinate system. To satisfy the principle of general relativity, the laws of 
his gravitation theory required a coordinate-general expression. He referred to that requirement as 
the principle of general covariance. 
 
With the equivalence principle and the requirement of general covariance to which it 
commits us, no longer was there an equivalence class of preferred coordinate systems determined 
by the laws, and no longer were there the global affine, conformal, and metrical structures. 
Though Einstein did not use the locution ‘background-independence,’ he certainly appealed to 
the notion in his own characterisations of the general theory. I will call that notion 
 
Proposal 1. A theory is background-independent if it satisfies the requirement of general 
covariance. 
 
But no sooner have we this proposal to hand than we must respond to an objection: general 
covariance was trivialised nearly as soon as it was presented. In the 1916 paper, Einstein gave an 
argument for general covariance that, following Stachel, we now know as the ‘point-coincidence 
argument.’ The locution ‘point-coincidence’ refers to the view that all physical observations 
consist in the determination of purely topological relations (coincidences) between objects of 
spatiotemporal perception. The argument runs as follows: (P1) All evidence for or against a 
physical theory rests on immediately verifiable facts. (P2) Immediately verifiable facts are 
exhausted by point-coincidences. (C) Thus, physical observations are reducible to point-
coincidences. On this argument, any mapping that preserves point-coincidences preserves a 
theory’s physical content, and thus, no coordinate system is privileged. 
                                                        
2There is more to say about the tenability of the principle of general relativity and the alleged equivalence of frames, 
but I will not address that here. See DiSalle (2006). 
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In 1917, Erich Kretschmann brought to light an important physical implication of the 
point-coincidence argument that he took to trivialise general covariance. He thought that, if 
indeed a theory’s physical content is exhausted by point-coincidences, the equations of any 
theory can be made generally covariant without a modification of that content. Kretschmann’s 
challenge was taken seriously in the 1960s by Trautman, Anderson, Wheeler, Fock, and others, 
who learnt to distinguish the requirement of general covariance from the symmetries that 
Einstein’s equations admit. Henceforth, we will be discussing those symmetries and not the 
requirement of general covariance as understood by Einstein. 
 
3. The Anderson-Friedman programme 
James Anderson challenged the view that general covariance is the characteristic feature 
of general relativity, pointing out, as did Kretschmann, that any theory can be given a generally 
covariant formulation. He claimed that the characteristic feature of general relativity is the 
representation of its metric affine geometry by what he called a ‘dynamical object.’ To state his 
claim properly, I will give an abstract characterisation of a classical field theory. I do so only in 
meanest outline and in a familiar notation. See Pitts (2006) for a more technically and historically 
careful treatment of the Anderson-Friedman programme and the differences between Anderson’s 
and Friedman’s definitions. 
 
Let me represent the space-time of a classical field theory T as an ordered n-tuple of the 
form (M, O1, ..., On), where M is a smooth manifold and O1 , ... , On are geometric objects on M. 
Defining geometric objects is a non-trivial task, but, in general, the objects in question here will 
be tensors and tensor fields but also tensor-like objects such as the Christoffel symbol, which is 
required for the definition of the covariant derivative. The dynamical laws of T will be built up 
out of these geometric objects. These laws have the form f(O1, ..., On) = 0. 
 
Let me now turn to the concept of an automorphic mapping of geometric objects on the 
manifold. If such a mapping is infinitely differentiable, one-to-one, onto, and has an infinitely 
differentiable inverse, then that mapping, denoted d, is called a diffeomorphism, and M and M’ 
are said to be diffeomorphic, that is, have identical manifold structure. The arbitrary 
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diffeomorphisms d form a group, often denoted diff(M) as a reminder that they are 
automorphisms of M. Elements of diff(M) act on the geometric objects of the theory in question. 
 
With this framework to hand, let me return to Anderson’s (1967, 83-84) proposal for 
characterising general relativity and other classical field theories in terms of two kinds of 
geometric objects. (The following definitions are Michael Friedman’s (1983, 57-60) 
reformulation of Anderson’s original definitions.) A geometric object φi is an absolute object of 
T just in case, given two models (M, φi) and (M, θi) for T, φi and θi are invariant under 
diff(M). Anderson called a geometric object that does not satisfy this definition a dynamical 
object. 
 
Anderson’s distinction between absolute and dynamical objects is the basis of his 
definition of a theory’s symmetry group; namely, the largest subgroup of diff(M) that leaves 
invariant the theory’s absolute objects. It is noteworthy that, though Anderson defines a theory’s 
symmetry group in terms of that theory’s antecedently defined absolute objects, on an alternative 
understanding, the lack of absolute objects would be expressed by the lack of non-trivial 
symmetries. 
 
That definition is significant in that in confronts Kretschmann’s challenge head-on: 
theories may be rewritten so that their geometric objects are invariant under the actions of 
subgroups of diff(M) like the Poincaré group or so that they are invariant under diff(M) itself, 
even though, in their standard formulation, they would be invariant only under more limited 
mapping groups. It is precisely the further requirement expressed in the above definition that is 
supposed to distinguish a theory’s symmetry group from its mapping or covariance group. That 
requirement, on Anderson’s account, distinguishes general relativity, whose metric affine 
geometry is characterised by a dynamical object, from previous theories.3 
 
We now have the basic concepts with which to consider the next candidate for 
background-independence. Before moving on, however, I want to note that in this framework the 
requirement of general covariance is satisfied to the extent that all of a theory’s geometric objects                                                         
3I will not address the debate over whether general relativity has an absolute object. 
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are invariant under diff(M); thus, I will refer henceforth to general covariance as diffeomorphism-
invariance. At this point, I also note that both Sorkin (2002) and Rovelli (2001, 2004) identify 
background-independence with diffeomorphism-invariance, albeit with some qualification in 
Rovelli’s case. 
 
4. Background-structure encoded in geometric objects and beyond 
I have presented the definition of an absolute object not only to move beyond the 
trivialisation of general covariance but because Anderson took the presence of absolute objects in 
a theory to imply that theory’s commitment to a certain form of background-structure, though he 
himself did not use that expression. Thus, the Anderson-Friedman definition provides us with 
another strategy for identifying background-independence, which I will call 
 
Proposal 2. A theory is background-independent just in case it has no absolute objects. 
 
Note that I have not written ‘A theory is background-independent just in case it contains no 
absolute objects under diff(M).’ It matters little whether the group is diff(M) or some other more 
physically restrictive group––what is dynamical under one group or equivalence relation may be 
absolute under another. What matters is that the relevant concept of background is entirely 
encoded in the geometric objects on the manifold. 
 
But no sooner have we this proposal to hand than we must respond to several objections. I 
will consider two here. The first holds that the Anderson-Friedman distinction between absolute 
and dynamical objects cannot capture the intended and essentially physical distinction. Robert 
Geroch (reported in Friedman 1983, 59, n. 9) pointed out that even in general relativity, with a 
metric affine geometry characterised by a dynamical object, one might draw up a scenario in 
which geometric objects like nowhere-vanishing vector fields and symplectic forms count as 
absolute objects. He made his point with the following example. Suppose we have a 
cosmological model in which there is omnipresent dust, all the particles of which are at rest in 
some Lorentz frame. The density of the dust particles n is defined as the number of particles per 
unit volume in the unique inertial frame in which the particles are at rest. The motion of the dust 
is expressed in terms of its flux across a surface defined by N = nU, where N is the number-flux 
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4-vector and U is the 4-velocity of the particles. In such a universe, the velocity field U would be 
nowhere-vanishing, and would count as an absolute object on Friedman’s definition; that is, there 
would be a background reference frame in the imaginary model, the rest frame of the dust. 
Roberto Torretti (1984) gave another counterexample to the Anderson-Friedman distinction. He 
formulated a theory of modified Newtonian mechanics that admits models of constant non-
positive curvature. He pointed out that such curvature is undeniably a kind of background-
structure, yet escapes the Anderson-Friedman definition of absoluteness. Pitts (2006) presents 
and discusses still other counterexamples. 
 
Depending on one’s sensibilities, this line of objection may be reason enough for giving 
up Proposal 2. But let me set this aside here. I think the bearing of these sorts of counterexamples 
on the viability of the Anderson-Friedman programme is a separate issue, and one that exceeds 
the scope of this paper. 
 
Let me take up another line of objection. This objection strikes at Proposal 2 in a different 
way. Proposal 2 commits us to the view that background-(in)dependence is an all or nothing 
affair. However, Gordon Belot (2010, 12-20) has recently pointed out that the concept admits of 
degrees. He considers the vacuum solutions to Einstein’s field equations that give rise to de 
Sitter, anti-de Sitter, and Minkowski space-times. These and other vacuum solutions have 
boundary conditions such that the resulting space-times have the global asymptotic behaviour of 
one of the spaces of constant curvature. 
 
In slightly more detail: take some theory formulated in the framework of general relativity 
and suppose that one builds into the kinematically possible configurations of its dynamical 
objects not only the requirement of smoothness and global hyperbolicity, from which 
determinism is obtained, but also the requirement that space approximates Minkowskian 
geometry as one approaches spatial infinity. Such a theory will have no geometric objects that 
encode a background, but such a theory will admit diff(M) only locally, not generally; only a 
subgroup of diff(M) will preserve the asymptotic boundary conditions. The theory will lie 
between paradigmatically background-dependent theories in which geometric objects propagate 
in Minkowski space-time and paradigmatically background-independent theories such as 
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spatially compact general relativity. So, even though the theory has no geometric objects that 
encode background-structure, the boundary conditions ensure that any solution has the structure 
of a Minkowskian background at spatial infinity. 
 
To make precise various degrees of background-(in)dependence, Belot introduces a 
distinction between a theory’s geometrical and physical degrees of freedom. The geometrical 
degrees of freedom are represented by the geometric objects, figuring in the dynamical laws of a 
theory, that parametrise the equivalence classes of space-time geometries. The physical degrees 
of freedom are represented by the geometric objects that parametrise the quotient space obtained 
by identifying gauge-equivalent solutions. A theory is then said to be fully background-dependent 
just in case it has no geometrical degrees of freedom, and fully background-independent just in 
case its geometrical and physical degrees of freedom match. Of greater moment, however, is the 
possibility of characterising theories of ambiguous background-structure. A theory is said to be 
nearly background-dependent if it has only finitely many geometrical degrees of freedom, and 
nearly background-independent if it has a finite number of non-geometrical degrees of freedom. 
In this way, Proposal 2 is both recovered and situated in a wider spectrum of possibilities in 
which its uniqueness is undermined. 
 
Belot’s distinctions help clarify the idea that there are various degrees of background-
(in)dependence; in the same measure, they sharpen the ambiguity of the concept of background-
structure. But, setting aside Belot’s approach, there is a more general sense in which the concept 
is ambiguous. Provided that a theory has no absolute objects, does background-independence 
require (i) that a theory presuppose nothing about global structure or (ii) that a theory preclude 
the possibility of such structure? For general relativity could be said to satisfy neither (i) nor (ii) 
since the theory holds that geometry is everywhere locally Lorentzian, making Belot’s point 
trivially true, or general relativity could be said to satisfy only (i) in that geometry is dependent 
on matter distribution. Though I leave aside the case against background-independence for the 
sequel to this paper, this particular ambiguity already suggests a reason to avoid taking 
background-independence as a philosophical requirement. 
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Belot’s point also provides an opportunity to comment on the distinction between local 
and global structure in general relativity. The general theory departs from Newtonian theory and 
special relativity in that it places no a priori restrictions on global structure; to put the point in 
Carnapian terms, global geometry is relegated to the P-rules of the framework. But that 
departure, though radical, does not stem from any philosophical motivation to construct a theory 
with that characteristic but from the fact that the equivalence principle motivates a purely local 
definition of a geodesic.4 
 
With Belot’s point, we have moved well beyond Anderson’s technical expectations for 
his definition. But, whether or not Anderson foresaw such objections to his absolute-dynamical 
distinction himself, we must bear in mind that he sought to address Kretschmann’s challenge, 
proposing a means of distinguishing a theory’s covariance group from its symmetry group. Thus, 
in reply to the question whether we are being unfair to Anderson, I believe we must situate his 
distinction in that context. More generally, Anderson seems to have been motivated by the task of 
characterising what is conceptually distinctive about general relativity without appealing to 
philosophical oversimplifications. 
 
5. Further beyond geometric objects 
To this point, I have only considered some of the strongest mathematical structures that 
may be imposed on a manifold; namely, metrics and other geometric objects both absolute and 
dynamical. I have also considered the imposition of asymptotic boundary conditions from which 
background-structure may arise. In contrast, Smolin (2006) points out that one may count 
dimension, topological and differential structure, and even the metric signature as background-
structure, though he leaves as an open question whether lower levels of background-structure are 
essential or may be eliminated in a future theory. Though I take Smolin’s suggestion seriously, it 
reinforces the idea that there is something chimaerical about background-independence; no 
sooner have we cut off one head than two more spring up to take its place; no sooner do we seem 
to be getting a hold of the concept when it slips away again. In any case, it is noteworthy that 
general relativity presupposes these lower-level features, yet allows for solutions in which they 
are violated by (e.g.) singularities.                                                         
4I am grateful to Robert DiSalle for conversations and corrections on these points. 
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Let me return to the problem of taxonomy. At this point, one might want to set aside the 
lower levels of background-structure identified by Smolin in order to frame a proposal that 
encompasses Belot’s point alone. One might try to formulate something like a Proposal 2a: A 
theory is background-independent just in case it contains no absolute objects and does not have 
background-structures arising from boundary conditions imposed on the theory. But this seems 
gerrymandered in the extreme, and, in any case, it is subject to the same ambiguities I raised 
above. So how are we to fix the extension of background-independence so as to include those 
kinds of background-structures that are not defined in terms of geometric objects on a manifold? 
I shall draw on Smolin (2006), Giulini (2007), and Belot (2010), and, though I do not do full 
justice to their views, I think something like the following underpins them: 
 
Proposal 3. A theory is background-independent just in case it has no framework that 
shapes the evolution of the fields without itself being shaped by them. 
 
This proposal is very nearly the so-called action-reaction principle: for something to be physical 
it cannot act without being acted upon. That principle, Einstein claimed, was part of the basis that 
motivated him to look beyond Newtonian physics and special relativity for a successor theory. 
And the idea certainly lies behind Anderson’s definition of an absolute object. I will not criticise 
here Einstein’s view that space-time should not act without being acted upon; see DiSalle (2002). 
Nor will I address the bearing of the action-reaction principle on discussions of background-
independence. I will note only that the action-reaction principle seems to loom behind nearly all 
proposals for fixing the extension of background-independence. 
 
A metaphor by Novalis––‘Theories are nets: only he who casts will catch’––is 
particularly apt for the evaluation of Proposal 3. The main objection to Proposal 3 is that it is a 
step too far; it is a catch-all for nearly any kind of mathematics used in the formulation of a 
theory. Proposals 1 and 2 are subsumed, but room is left for other conceptions of background-
structure. It may be that a finer-grained classification is possible, one that offers intermediate 
proposals between 2 and 3, but I will not attempt that here; I will err on the side of greater 
generality rather than greater specificity. I will note only that, by catching everything, Proposal 3 
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blurs even the line between the language required for saying anything at all and properly 
theoretical claims within that language. Where that line is drawn will vary from theory to theory, 
and, if it can ever be drawn sharply, it will not be drawn a priori or by some philosophical 
requirement like background-independence. As ever, it will be an empirical phenomenon––some 
physical criterion––like the light postulate or the equivalence principle that governs the 
application of some or another corpus of mathematical theory. For instance, one needs an 
empirical reason to impose asymptotic boundary conditions in general relativity, and, in view of 
that, one might not want to formulate the theory or a philosophical requirement on the theory so 
that such an imposition is precluded a priori. At very least, an important strength of Proposal 2 
over Proposal 3––or any proposal underpinned by the action-reaction principle––is that it does 
not dissolve the important differentiation of background-structures into a ‘night in which all cows 
are black.’ 
 
If Proposal 3 is a step too far, what, if anything, remains to be said about Proposal 2? I 
have presented the negative case for Proposal 2: I have charged it with failing to account for 
kinds of background-structure that are not encoded in the geometric objects on a manifold. 
Though that particular criticism is certainly bound up with the Anderson-Friedman programme, I 
would like to distance the failure of Proposal 2 from the viability of that programme. The net cast 
by Anderson was a good one, so good that we learn a great deal by considering what slips 
through. It is a virtue of the Anderson-Friedman programme that it highlights the global nature of 
the background-structures presupposed by the classes of inertial frames in Newtonian theory and 
special relativity, and it highlights the way in which the equivalence principle forces us to revise 
our understanding of those structures––no longer presuppositions of the dynamics but evolving 
along with the classical fields. That one can formulate counterexamples to the effect that general 
relativity has such and such an absolute object does not diminish the Anderson-Friedman 
programme’s basic characterisation of the difference between theories formulated in a Newtonian 
or special-relativistic framework, on the one hand, and those formulated in a general-relativistic 
framework, on the other. In this way, that programme sharpens––and does not blur––the 





So what are the taxa? With each of my three proposals, I have tried to identify a genuine 
candidate for background-independence. There is a sense in which the requirement of general 
covariance is a candidate for background-independence. But, as we know, Kretschmann’s point 
was that other theories that are not generally covariant in their standard formulation may be 
reformulated, a point that the Anderson-Friedman programme masterfully addressed. There is 
also a sense in which a theory that is free of absolute objects is a candidate for background-
independence. Indeed, I have treated general covariance and a theory’s freedom from absolute 
objects as separate proposals. However, I think the fundamental taxonomical grouping is between 
those kinds of background-structures are that encoded in geometric objects and all those that are 
not. Proposals 1 and 2 are therefore two species of the same genus. Proposal 3 is something of a 
catch-all, but, there too, one might distinguish between different species; namely, background-
structure arising from the imposition of boundary conditions on a theory and lower levels of 
background-structure. It may be that a still finer-grained classification is possible, but, even 
considering only the case of general relativity, the ambiguity of what taking background-
independence as a philosophical requirement might mean casts doubt on the fruitfulness of the 
task. 
 
Let me summarise what I take from the foregoing: (i) It is sometimes said that 
diffeomorphism invariance and background-independence are synonymous. One goal of this 
paper has been to prise these concepts apart. (ii) There is an important difference between those 
forms of background-structure that are encoded in the geometric objects on a manifold and those 
that are not. Identifying background-(in)dependence with the presence or absence of absolute 
objects fails to account for forms of background-structure that are not encoded in the geometric 
objects on a manifold. (iii) There is something peculiar about the situation of Einstein’s 
geometrisation of gravity. Although that geometrisation was an empirically well-motivated move 
in his construction of general relativity, there is not an equally clear motivation to formulate the 
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